

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

17 July 1958

AD/RR
THRU : Chief, E
THRU : Chief, D/S
Chief, S/IR

"Soviet Bloc Transportation Capability to Launch and Support a Campaign into the Area between the Baltic Sea and the Alps. (Rail)"

1. The subject paper is the railroad part of the study which for many years was known as the "WSEG Study" or EIC-P-8. The EIC at its meeting of 5 June 1958 noted that the Preliminary Draft of EIC-P-8 which was forwarded to the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) on 19 August 1954 adequately filled the WSEG request for the subject report, and agreed that the revised draft of the study should be completed by the Transportation Capabilities Estimation Group (TCEG) and should be published as an Army ACEI, Intelligence Report, showing participating agency concurrences or reservations.

2. The Chairman of the TCEG (Mr. Farrell of the Army) has now submitted a draft of the subject study to me in my capacity as CIA Member of the TCEG, and requests my concurrence in the study or a statement of my reservations by 23 July 1958.

3. The economic data contained in the study appear to be a true representation of our contribution to the study. These data include a statement that the railroads of Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary are currently satisfying the demands of the economies of these countries for rail transportation, and that there have been improvements in these systems during the Post World War II period. In addition, we have supplied data from our current estimates on these countries of route mileage, tons originated, ton-mile performance and inventories of locomotives and cars. The other parts of the paper contain estimates on the military transport capabilities of the seven railroad lines considered in the paper, and descriptive information on the routes of these lines.

4. The study concludes:

a. That 167 through, military trains each way per day could be operated for a sustained period (in excess of three months) across Eastern Europe in the areas under consideration, and terminate approximately 98,000 net short tons

~~SECRET~~

daily at the western frontiers of the Eastern European Satellites. In order to accomplish this movement 2100 locomotives and 96,400 freight cars would be required.

b. That 212 through, military trains each way per day could be operated for a short period (maximum of 30 days) and terminate 124,400 short tons daily at the western frontiers of the Eastern European Satellites. Approximately 2720 locomotives and 122,400 freight cars would be required to sustain such a movement.

c. That the selected Polish rail lines have a capability to move tonnage to the Oder-Neisse river line in excess of East Germany's forwarding capability to the extent of 24,400 short tons each way per day for a sustained period and 31,200 short tons for a short period.

d. That the railroad lines, therefore, have a capability of maintaining 196 USSR Army divisions and supporting air to the extent of one air regiment per ground division.

e. That the supply of locomotives and rolling stock within the four countries in question is amply adequate to support the military through-put tonnage capability of the selected lines for each time period. (Our estimates contained in the report, show that there are about 20,000 standard gauge locomotives and 520,000 standard gauge freight cars in use on the railroad systems of the four countries concerned in the estimate.)

5. The military transport capability listed above is estimated to be 75 percent of the estimated actual capability of the lines in question. The remaining 25 percent of the actual capability is reserved in this study for local economic traffic and supplies needed for operation of the railroad.

6. The estimates of military transport capability are consistent with the estimates in earlier drafts of the subject report, and with current estimates of the same type prepared [REDACTED]. The only current estimates that differ significantly from those of the subject report have been prepared by USAREUR at Heidelberg. These estimates are higher, but apply only to East Germany, and are not comparable in other important respects. I have not checked the military estimates of the subject report in great detail. To do so would involve an expenditure of man hours that is not believed warranted on what is essentially military intelligence. Rough checks against economic data indicate, however, that the military estimates are not out of line either in terms of train operation or allocations for economic traffic in wartime on the lines considered.

25X1X7

~~SECRET~~

7. It gives me great pleasure to be able to recommend that I, as the CIA Member of the TCEB, be permitted to concur in the subject report, particularly in view of the difficulty we have had with some of the Army estimates in the recent past. There are a few minor substantive matters and some editorial errors associated with the present draft of the report which I shall take up with Mr. Farrell, Chairman of the TCEB, independently, and I anticipate no difficulty in getting him to adopt my suggestions.

25X1A9a
[REDACTED]

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - Chief, E
1 - Chief, D/S ✓
2 - S/TR

25X1A9a

ORR/S/TR/[REDACTED]/njlw/2745 (17 Jul 58)